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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1713 
___________ 
 
HECTOR HERBERT HENDERSON, 
         Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A209-307-955) 
Immigration Judge:  John B. Carle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 19, 2019 
 
Before:  MCKEE, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 30, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Hector Herbert Henderson, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of an order of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his application for withholding of 
removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  For the reasons 
that follow, we will dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.  
I. 
 Henderson is a citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States in 1989 on a 
visitor’s visa1 and has remained since.  In 2015, he was convicted of possession with 
intent to deliver cocaine, in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).  In April 2017, 
Henderson was ordered removed as an aggravated felon pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b).  
Henderson subsequently expressed a fear of return to Jamaica, and he was referred to 
withholding-only proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e). 
 At the merits hearing, Henderson testified that he worked as a policeman in 
Jamaica from 1979 to 1984, while the People’s National Party (PNP) was in power.  
Henderson worked as part of the security team for Michael Henry, a politician affiliated 
with the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP).  Based on Henderson’s police work and his 
affiliation with the JLP, he was threatened by the “Clansmen” and other members of the 
PNP.  In 1980, Henderson’s partner was shot and killed in a shootout with the Clansmen.  
                                              
1 The parties appear to dispute whether the visa was fraudulent.  We need not resolve that 
issue in order to adjudicate this appeal. 
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In 1984, Henderson was ambushed by four Clansmen and was shot.  The shooters in both 
incidents were eventually apprehended or killed by Jamaican authorities. 
Because he feared the Clansmen, Henderson left the police force and lived in 
hiding in Ocho Rios for five years before coming to the United States in 1989.  
Henderson fears that if he returns to Jamaica he will be targeted and killed by the 
Clansmen.  Although the PNP is no longer the political party in power, Henderson 
testified that he believes the JLP-led government will be unable to protect him from the 
Clansmen.  
The Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Henderson was credible, but 
nonetheless denied relief.  The IJ found that Henderson was ineligible for withholding of 
removal based on his conviction for unlawful trafficking of controlled substances, which 
presumptively constitutes a particularly serious crime.  Henderson did not dispute that his 
conviction constitutes a particularly serious crime.   
With respect to Henderson’s CAT claim, the IJ determined that his fear was based 
on “stringing together a series of suppositions,”2 which was insufficient to show that it 
was more likely than not that Henderson would suffer torture “at the hands of anyone, let 
alone with the government’s acquiescence.”  IJ Op. at 13, 14.  The IJ emphasized that 
                                              
2 Specifically, Henderson maintained that if he is deported, his name will be added to a 
list; that the list would be given to police, who would in turn give it to the Clansmen; that 
the Clansmen would be interested in harming Henderson; and that the Clansmen would 
successfully locate Henderson, at which point they would torture or kill him. 
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Henderson had safely lived in Ocho Rios for several years without suffering harm, and 
that Henderson did not indicate that the PNP or the Clansmen expressed any interest in 
him while he has resided in the United States for the past 29 years.  With respect to 
acquiescence by a public official in Jamaica, the IJ emphasized the evidence that the 
government has apprehended or killed the individuals who had harmed Henderson, and 
the fact that the PNP is no longer in power.  In reaching this determination, the IJ noted 
that government acquiescence can include willful blindness. 
Henderson appealed to the BIA.  Henderson did not raise any challenge to the IJ’s 
ruling that Henderson was ineligible for withholding of removal based on his conviction 
of a particularly serious crime.  Thus, the BIA affirmed that ruling.  With respect to 
Henderson’s CAT claim, the BIA found no clear error with the IJ’s factual findings.  
Applying de novo review, and relying on the IJ’s analysis, the BIA determined that 
Henderson had not shown that it was more likely or not that he would be tortured.  The 
BIA also determined that Henderson “did not show the required acquiescence by a public 
official in light of the arrest, prosecution, and killing of individuals who inflicted harm 
upon him.”  BIA Op. at 2.  The BIA made clear that the legal standard for acquiescence 
included “the concept of willful blindness.”  Id.  Accordingly, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
denial of Henderson’s CAT claim.  This petition for review followed. 
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II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), subject to the discussion below.  
Because Henderson was convicted of an aggravated felony,3 our jurisdiction is limited to 
constitutional claims and questions of law.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Pareja v. Att’y 
Gen. U.S., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010).  We exercise plenary review over the 
agency’s legal determinations.  See id. at 192.  When, as here, the BIA adopts the 
findings of the IJ and discusses some of the bases for the IJ’s opinion, our review 
encompasses both decisions.   See Guzman v. Att’y Gen., 770 F.3d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
III. 
 To succeed on his CAT claim,4 Henderson had to establish that it is “more likely 
than not” that he would be tortured should he return to Jamaica.  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2); 
                                              
3 The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Henderson’s argument—raised only in his stay 
motion—that he was not convicted of an aggravated felony, as he failed to exhaust that 
claim before the BIA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  Henderson has not argued, and the 
record does not indicate, that the BIA was incompetent to consider such a claim, see 
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447-48 (3d Cir. 2005), or that there are any other 
grounds to excuse exhaustion or to deem the claim exhausted, see Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 
F.3d 114, 119-24 (3d Cir. 2008).  Moreover, even if the Court had jurisdiction, a 
conviction under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) for intent to distribute cocaine is an 
aggravated felony.  See Avila v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 826 F.3d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 2016). 
4 Henderson has waived any arguments regarding his application for withholding of 
removal by failing to present them in his brief.  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 235 
(3d Cir. 2004).  Even if he were to challenge the agency’s determination that he is 
ineligible for withholding because he was convicted of a particularly serious crime, we 
would lack jurisdiction to review that claim, as Henderson failed to exhaust it before the 
BIA, and has not argued that there are any grounds to excuse exhaustion.  See 8 U.S.C. 
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Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2002).  He also needed to show that 
the torture would be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).  The likelihood of torture is 
comprised of a factual component (“what is likely to happen to the petitioner if 
removed”) and a legal one (“does what is likely to happen amount to the legal definition 
of torture”).  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  Government 
acquiescence is similarly composed of a factual (“how public officials will likely act in 
response to the harm the petitioner fears”) and legal component (“whether the likely 
response from public officials qualifies as acquiescence”).  See Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 
F.3d 509, 516 (3d Cir. 2017).  Here, the Court may only review the legal component of 
each inquiry.  See Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515. 
To the extent that Henderson has challenged the agency’s determination that he 
failed to show that it is “more likely than not” that he will be tortured in the event of his 
return to Jamaica, we lack jurisdiction to consider his claims.  Henderson’s brief 
mentions that the IJ “tried to minimize” his fear of returning to Jamaica.  He does not 
argue that the agency ignored evidence, but rather disagrees with its weighing of the 
evidence.  Accordingly, this claim challenges the agency’s factual findings, which we 
lack jurisdiction to review.  See Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 507 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(differentiating claim that evidence was ignored, from claim that IJ incorrectly weighed 
                                              
§ 1252(d)(1); Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 447-48; Lin, 543 F.3d at 119-24. 
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evidence in making factual determinations).  We similarly lack jurisdiction to consider 
Henderson’s challenge—raised only in his reply brief—to the agency’s factual finding 
that he lived safely in Ocho Rios for five years.  We can discern no other challenge to the 
agency’s determination regarding the likelihood of torture. 
 Because the Board’s holding regarding the likelihood of torture, which we cannot 
disturb, is dispositive, we need not reach Henderson’s core argument that the agency 
employed an incorrect legal standard in determining that the Jamaican government would 
not “acquiesce” to his torture.  See Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 671 F.3d 303, 
311 (3d Cir. 2011).  In any event, it is evident from the record that the BIA and IJ 
considered “willful blindness.”  See Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 473 F.3d 58, 70 
(3d Cir. 2007).  To the extent that Henderson challenges the agency’s factual findings 
regarding how public officials will likely act in response to the harm he fears, we lack 
jurisdiction to review that claim.  See Green, 694 F.3d 503 (determination that Jamaican 
government would not acquiesce in torture was factual determination that resulted from 
weighing of evidence, which the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider).5 
                                              
5 Henderson also argues that the BIA’s application of clear error review to the IJ’s factual 
findings was improper, without specifying how the BIA erred, other than to repeat his 
argument that the BIA applied the wrong standard for government acquiescence.  Again, 
to the extent that Henderson raises a challenge the BIA’s weighing of the evidence, we 
lack jurisdiction to review that claim.  To the extent that Henderson attempts to raise a 
legal challenge, we note that the BIA followed its regulations and applied the proper clear 
error standard to its review of the IJ’s factual determinations.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i); see also Wallace v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 135, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (“a 
review of the factual record by the BIA does not convert its discretionary determination 
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Finally, we note that Henderson has raised several ambiguous “Due Process” 
claims.   We lack jurisdiction to consider these claims because they were not raised 
before the BIA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 107-08 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  As with his other unexhausted claims, Henderson has not argued that there 
are any grounds to excuse exhaustion.  See Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 447-48; Lin, 543 
F.3d at 119-24.6  To the extent that these claims need not be exhausted, they remain 
undeveloped, and therefore they are meritless. 
Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review in part and deny it in part. 
                                              
as to whether a petitioner warrants [relief] into improper factfinding”). 
6 We note that the BIA denied Henderson’s motion to remand so that he could introduce 
new evidence of a January 2018 letter from Michael Henry.  Henderson has not 
challenged that ruling.  Even if he had, the BIA’s determination was reasonable.  See 
Huang v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2010).  The letter was 
cumulative of a July 2017 letter from Henry in the record, and the 2017 letter undercut 
Henderson’s assertion that the 2018 letter was previously unavailable. 
